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RECENT IMPORTANT DECISIONS 
ADVERS& Possess10N-MARKETABL& TITL&.-Land had been in the posses-
sion of P and his predecessors for twenty-eight years in such a manner 
that the court found that, beyond a reasonable doubt, title had been estab-
lished by adverse possession. Held, that P could give D, a purchaser, a good 
and marketable title. Willer v. Hooper (Md., 1921), n5 Atl. 31. 
It is now almost unanimously conceded! that a title by adverse posses-
sion is a marketable one. Scott v. Nixon, 3 Dr. & War. (Ir.) 388; Barnard 
v. Brown, II2 Mich. 452; and cases cited in 38 L. R. A. (n. s.) 26. A few 
cases hold the contrary. Watso1i v. Boyle, 55 Wash. 141; Lockhart v. Fer-
rey, 59 Ore. 179; Benso1i v. Shotwell, 87 Cal. 49. The burden is on the 
vendor to show that all the elements are present which are necessary to 
establish adverse possession. Simis v. McElroy, 160 N. Y. 156, 73 Am. St. 
Rep. 673. Of course, if the contract of sale calls for a record title, adverse 
possession is not sufficient. Nayes v. Johnson, 139 Mass. 436. It is said in 
Tewksbury v. Howard, 138 Ind. 103, that "title by adverse possession is as 
high as any known to the law." But, as a practical matter, it would seem 
that property with a clear record title could be more readily sold than that 
which has a title based solely on the legal theory of adverse possession. 
For this reason it seems that the vendor should be required to use every 
reasonable effort to perfect the record title before invoking the aid of equity 
to force a vendee to take a title based on adverse possession. For market-
able title generally, see 8 MICH. L. Rev. 493. 
BoNA Fms PuRcHAS:ER-PuRcHAS:ER NOT SECURING LEGAL EsTAT&-PuR-
CHASER NOT PAYING FULL Pruci;.-The plaintiff contracted to sell half of a 
parcel of land which he owned. By mistake the contract called for the 
whole parcel. The vendee assigned the contract to the defendant, Johnson, 
who fraudulently executed a land contract to an innocent purchaser, Roger- • 
son (also made defendant), purporting to sell the whole parcel to him. In 
a suit for reformation of the contracts it was held, that the innocent party 
was a bona fide purchaser for value (not discussed) and that as against 
him the plaintiff was only entitled to a lien on the unpaid purchase money, 
and that upon payment to the plaintiff of the value of the land included by 
mistake the latter should convey the whole parcel. Clark v. Jo/mso1i, 214 
Mich. 577. 
Regarding the rights of a purchaser who has obtained legal title and 
paid part consideration before receiving notice of a prior equitable claim, 
the American cases are in conflict. Some courts would give such a purchaser 
no protection against the owner of the prior equity, except perhaps a lien 
on any amount still due from the latter to the vendor. Palmer v. T¥illiams, 
24 Mich. 328; Kilcrease v. Lum and Wife, 36 Miss. 56g. Others hold the 
innocent purchaser entitled to remuneration for the amount paid in good 
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faith. Kitteridge v. C/zapm<m, 36 Iowa 348; Beck v. Uhrich, I6 Pa. St. 499. 
And others hold that the purchase is valid, the owner of the prior equity 
being entitled only to a lien on the unpaid purchase money. Baldwi1i et al. 
v. Sager, 70 Ill. 503; Hardin:s e:r'rs., etc., v. Harrfagto1i, etc., 74 Ky. 367. 
Nor are the American cases in accord on the rule to be applied when the 
purchaser pays full consideration before notice, but acquires legal title sub-
sequent to notice. Some deny protection to such a purchaser. Cor1i v. Sims, 
60 Ky. 39I; Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Boykin, 76 Ala. 560; and 
references, 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (Ed. 2), §566 (p. 2I74). Others hold 
the party entitled to the rights of a bona fide purchaser for value. Carroll v. 
Jolmsto1i, 55 N. C. 120. See also Dueber Watch Case Mfg. Co. v. Daugh-
erty et al., 62 Ohio St. 589; and references, 2 TIFFANY, REA:r. PROPERTY (Ed. 
2), §566 (p. 2174). For a discussion of the principles underlying these rules, 
see Po:MERoy's EQ. JUR. (Ed. 4), §§737-743. Where,. as in the principal case, 
the purchaser has never obtained legal title (and especially where, as in this 
case, the prior equity is coupled with the legal estate), the prior equity 
should prevail (see Dickinso1i v. Wright, 56 Mich. 42), unless upon the theory 
that the prior equity is in some respect imperfect and intrinsically inferior 
to the later equity, as in Hmne v. Dixon, 37 Ohio St. 66. See also Bayley 
v. Greenleaf, 7 Wheat. 46, and Campbell, Adm:r., v. Sidwell, Ex'x., et al., 
61 Ohio St. 179. In the principal case it might be said that the plaintiff's 
equity of reformation is inferior because his more or less neg1igent conduct 
in executing a contract which described the whole lot misled the subsequent 
purchaser. An element of estoppel is involved. 
CARRIERS-CUMMINS AMENDMENT-LIMITATION OF LIABILITY IN Bil.LS OF 
LADING.-Eight carloads of grain shipped from grain-producing states to 
Baltimore, and described in the bills of lading as "for export,'' were destroyed 
in transit. Defendant railway :Paid plaintiffs, according to the terms of the 
bills of lading, "the value of the grain at the time and place of shipment.'' 
Plaintiffs sued for "the full amount of the actual loss," claiming that under 
the Cummins Amendment the stipulations in the bills of lading were null 
and void. Held, not a shipment within the Cummins Amendment, because 
in course of shipment to a non-adjacent foreign country, and so the stipu-
lations are valid. Fahey v. B. & 0. R. Co. (Md., I921), 114 Atl. 905. 
The limits within which the federal Act to Regulate Commerce, and· its 
amendments, will apply to shipments of goods are not yet clearly drawn. 
The Carmack Amendment of 1906 expressly applied to "transportation from 
a point in one state to a point in another state." Just why the Cummins 
Amendment of I9I5 e.'Ctended this to include transportation from or to a 
point in a territory or the District of Columbia, and "to a point in an adj a-
cent foreign country," instead: of making a comprehensive inclusion of all 
interstate and foreign commerce, is not explained, but for some reason a 
non-adjacent foreign country is excluded. In Galveston, etc., Ry. Co. v. 
W oodb!iry, 254 U. S. 357, see 19 MICH. L. REv. 433, the Supreme Court held 
that this was broad enough to cover shipment not merely to, but also from, -
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an adjacent foreign country. Such judicial legislation as this could not, of 
course, go the length of including what the statute noticeably e..'Ccluded, viz., 
transportation to or from a non-adjacent foreign country. In the instant 
case the question is, was this a shipment to such a country, Baltimore being 
the destination named in the bill of lading, though the grain was described 
as "for export"? The court hel<f that the determining factor was the inten-
tion as to destination with which the goods were accepted and delivered. 
This would be true even though the real design with which the transpor-
tation was started was not disclosed in the bill of lading. "The essential 
character of the commerce, not its mere accidents, should determine,'' quoted 
from Texas & N. 0. R. Co. v. Sabine Tram Co., 227 U. S. Ill. In theory 
this is sound; in practice it seems to involve liability in a sea of uncertainty. 
If all shipments were under the same rule of liability there would be no 
trouble, and why should ther be different rules in shipments subject to 
federal control? That is for the legislature, of course, which in the Car-
mack Amendment, the Cummins Amendment and the Act of August, 1916, 
e..'Cpressly made two classes. Most of the trouble arises because bills of 
lading do not express the real or full shipping directions, especially in ship-
ments subject to diversion before reaching destination. It seems that if the 
intent of the shipper to divert the shipment before reaching destination 
named in bill of lading does not appear in such bill, and is not known by 
the carrier, the bill of lading is regarded as the contempla:tion of the parties 
and controls the nature of the shipment, Bracht v. Sa1i A11to11io, etc., Ry. 
Company, 254 U. S. 489 (Jan., 1921), even though the reshipment be later 
entered on the first bill of lading, Pere Marquette Ry. Co. v. French, & Co., 
254 U. S. 538 (Jan., 1921), or the first bill be later surrendered for an intra-
state bill, A., T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Harold, 241 U. S. 371, for it is not deter-
mined by the intention the shipper may have had, but which does not 
find expression in any form of contract. Rice v. Oreg. Short Line R. Co. 
(id., May, 1921), lg8 Pac. 16!. Moreover, the first bill of lading governs 
the entire transportation, Ga., Fla. & Ala. Ry. Co. v. Blish Milling Co., 24'1 
U. S. 190, including the liability of connecting carriers. Wabash R'j•. Co. 
v. Holt, 263 Fed. 72. That the Cummins Amendment requires the liability 
to be measured by the actual loss, notwithstanding provisions in the bill of 
lading fixing the amount of the liability, is settled in C., M. & St. P. Ry. 
Co. v. McCaull-Dinsmore Co., 253 U. S. 99, affirming 260 Fed. 835. The 
Cummins Amendment controls not merely liability but also notice of claims 
for damages. Ga., Fla. & Ala. Ry. Co. v. Blish Co., sitpra; N. Y., P. f!r 
N. R. Co. v. Chandler (Va., 1921), 106 S. E. 684; Mann v. Fairfield & E. C. 
Co. (N. C., 1918), g6 S. E. 731. It does not, however, extend to loss occur-
ring after the carrier becomes a warehouseman, N. Y., P. & N. R. Co. v. 
Chandler, supra, and in accord with such holding is the recent case of 
Savage Factories v. Can. Northem Ry. Co. (Minn. 1921), 184 N. W. 367, 
holding that provisions in bills of lading as to notice of loss do not extend 
to loss of money collected on a C. 0. D. shipment and absconded with by 
the agent of the carrier express company. Such losses occur after the trans-
portation has ceased, and are not within the statute. 
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CARRIERS-EVIDENCE-BURDEN oF SHOWING NEGI.IGENCE ON SHIPPER.-An 
action was brought for damages due to an unreasonable delay in the delivery 
of a shipment of stock. The trial court proceeded upon the theory that the 
plaintiff had made a prima, facie case by showing a failure on the part of the 
defendant to transport the cattle within a reasonable time, and that the defend-
ant had the burden of showing that the delay was not due to negligence if he 
were to escape liability. Held, the plaintiff had the burden of proving that the 
delay was due to negligence. Bland v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. (Mo., 1921), 
232 s. w. 232. 
Whether the burden of proving negligence is upon the carrier or the 
shipper is a question upon which the courts are in conflict. The weight of 
authority holds that the burden is upon the shipper. Railroad v. Reeves, 
IO Wall. 176; Cochrm~ v. Dinsmore, 49 N. Y. 249; see 3 HuTCH'INSON oN 
CARRIERS (Ed. 3), p. 1599, and cases there cited. These cases proceed upon 
the theory that he who bases his cause of action upon negligence musf prove 
it. The weight of reason, however, seems to be with the minority case~ 
which hold that the shipper by showing a failure to comply with the con-
tract makes a prima facie case, and the carrier to• escape liability must prove 
that he was not negligent. Berry v. Cooper, 28 Ga. 543; Hinkle v. Railway 
Co., 126 N. C. 932; Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. v. Moss, 6o Miss. 1003. The minority 
cases proceed upon the theory, first, that the contract of carriage holds the 
carrier liable unless the damage resulted from one of the excepted causes, 
and was not due to negligence. Hence, a complete defense requires the 
carrier not only to bring himself within the exemption, but; also to prove no 
negligence on his part. Secondly, that negligence being a matter peculiarly 
within the knowledge of the carrier, public policy requires that he should 
have the burden of showing that he was free from negligence. The court 
in Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. v. Moss, supra, said: "In a large majority of cases the 
witnesses are the employees whose negligence has caused the loss, and even 
if known to the shipper, it may be dangerous for him to rest his case upon 
their testimony, since the natural inclinations of mankind would sway them, 
in narrating the circumstances, to palliate their fault by stating the occur-
rence in the most favorable light to themselves." Though the carrier is not 
an insurer against delay, and the plaintiff's cause of action in the principal 
case is founded solely upon negligence, yet the same public policy which 
induces the minority cases to place the burden as to negligence on the car-
rier, where loss or damage is involved, also requires that the carrier have 
that burden when the action is founded upon delay. To do otherwise would 
in many cases deny the shipper all redress, yet the principal case adopts such 
a rule. 
CARRJ:ERS-TuRMINATION oF LIABII.ITY AS CARRIER AFTER Ac~ANCE BY 
CONSIGNEE-UNIFORM BII.r. oF LADING.-The plaintiff was the consignee of 
a carload of goods under a uniform bill of ladfog which provides: "Property 
not removed by the party entitled to receive it, within 48 hours, exclusive of 
legal holidays, after notice of its arrival has been duly sent or given, may 
be kept in car, depot, or place of delivery of the carrier subject to a reason-
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able charge for storage and to carrier's responsibility as warehouseman 
only," etc. A half hour after receiving due notice of the car's arrival and 
its placement on a public delivery track the plaintiff accepted the car, broke 
the seals thereon and began to unload it. During the time the plaintiff \vas 
unloading (from 9:30 a. m. to 6:00 p. m.) part of the goods were stolen 
from the car. Held (McReynolds, ]., dissenting), the defendant is liable 
for the loss of the goods stolen. Michigaii Cent. R. Co. v. Mark Oweii & 
Co. (1921), 41 Sup. Ct. 554. 
The court held that by necessary implication from the provisions in the 
bill of lading the liability of the carrier was to attach to goods "not removed 
from the car" until the time when the liability as warehouseman should 
begin. The same construction was put upon this section of the bill of lading 
in Gary Bros. & Gaffke Co. v. Chicago, M. & -P. S. Ry. Co., 49 Mont. 
524, where the facts show entrance and inspection but not acceptance by the 
consignee. There the court said: "* * * the only thing which will e.."l:onerate 
the carrier as such, within 48 hours, is the removal of the property. In other 
words, the contract itself not only fixes the liability of the carrier, as such, 
but defines the character of the delivery which will suffice to avoid it." In 
McEntire v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., g8 Neb. 92, 828, where the con-
signee of goods under a similar bill of lading opened the car and without 
removing any of the contents put a lock of his own upon it, the court held 
there was a delivery terminating the railroad's liability as carrier. Here the 
lock was only symbolic of possession and gave to the consignee less control 
than that actually _possessed by the consignee in the principal case. In answer 
to the plaintiff's contention that the shipping contract placed an absolute 
liability upon the railroad as carrier during the 48 hours after notice until 
delivery by removal from the car, the court said: "But we do not believe 
the contract susceptible of this construction. A more reasonable construc-
tion seems to be that property not removed by the consignee within 48 hours 
after notice of its arrival may be left in the car subject to a reasonable 
charge for storage, and that the liability of the carrier shall be that of ware-
houseman only." In Mark Owe1i & Co. v. Michigan Cent. R. Co., 214 Ill. 
App. 94 whence this case was appealed, the court held that the bill of lading 
was to be construed most strongly against the carrier because the carrier 
was its author, Tesas & P.R. Co. v. Reiss, 183 U. S. 621, but both carriers 
and shippers, with some reluctance, accepted the uniform bill of Jading now 
in use in an agreement unde~ the guidance of the Interstate Commerce Com-
m1ss10n. Moreover, delivery to the proper party terminates a railroad's 
liability as carrier. 10 C. ]. 247. Regarding this point, the court in the prin-
cipal case said: "The property here was not delivered; access was only 
given to it that it might be removed, and 48 hours were given for that pur-
pose. Pending that time it was within the custcl'dy of the railroad company, 
the company having the same relation to it that the company acquired by its 
receipt and had during its transportation." Other courts hold the contrary. 
In Rothchild Bros. v. Northern P. R. Co., 68 Wash. 27, 40 L. R. A. (n. s.) 
773, the court held: "Not only had the bill of lading been surrendered and 
the car spotted upon the defendant's (the railroad company's) delivery 
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tracks for delivery before the fire occurred, but the plaintiff's agents had 
actually reached the car with teams, had broken the ·seal of the car, and 
had opened and entered it for the purpose of removing the property. This 
clearly constitutes a delivery. There was not only a surrender of the right 
of possession of the property by the defendant, but there was an actual 
taking of the property by the plaintiff. Delivery could not have been more 
complete had the wagons been actually loaded and started on their way to 
the plaintiff's warehouse." In Kenny Co. v. Atlanta & W. P. R. Co., 122 
Ga. 365, where the facts were similar to those of the principal case except 
that the consignee had also given a receipt in full, the court held that there 
' had been a delivery to the consignee and that the defendant, whose servants 
had subsequently closed and sealed the car for the night, had only the duty 
of a gratuitous bailee. Accord, Denver & R. G. R. Co. v. Johnson, 69 Colo. 
252. See also Ford v. American Express Co. et al., 203 Ill. App. 275. It 
would seem that the consignee, and not the railroad, had actual custody and 
possession of the goods when the loss occurred. The extraordinary liability 
of the carrier arose primarily because of the opportunity for fraud by the 
carrier, Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Ld. Raym.909, but after the consignee has 
entered the car and begun to unload it the opportunity for fraud shifts from 
the carrier to the consignee. The court's decision practically requires the 
carrier to station a watchman at each car while the consignee is unloading it. 
The decision increases the likelihood of carelessness and dishonesty on the 
part of those engaged in unloading freight and tends to promote less efficient 
action by the consignee in removing goods from the cars. In view of these 
considerations it is doubtful whether the Interstate Commerce Commission 
intended the uniform bill of lading, which it sponsored, to impose such a 
burden upon the carriers, and still more doubtful that public policy can 
justify it. The principal case is cited and approved in Del Signore v. Payne 
(W. Va., 1921), 109 S. E. 232. 
CoNS'ttru'tIONAL LAw-R.EsTRIC'tIONS oN Us~ OF STATS Mo~Ys AND 
Cru;:mT-SOLDmRs' BoNus LAw.-The legislature of New York passed a Sol-
diers' Bonus Act which was approved by a majority of the voters of the 
state. (Laws of 1920, c. 872.) The act provided for the issue of bonds by 
the state, the proceeds to be given as a bonus to those who served honorably 
in the military or naval service of the United States at any time during the 
war, and who were, at the time of entering the service and at the time the 
act took effect, residents of the state. The constitution of the state provides: 
"The credit of the state shall not in any matter be given or loaned to or in 
aid of any individual, association or corporation," Art. 7, §1; "Neither the 
credit nor the money of the' state shall be given or loaned to or in aid of 
any association, corporation or private undertaking," Art. 8, §g. Held (Car-
dozo and Pound, JJ., dissenting), under these provisions the act is uncon-
stitutional. People v. Westchester County Nat. Bank (Ct. of App. N. Y., 
1921), 132 N. E. 241. 
The court first pointed out that, in the absence of constitutional restric-
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tions, ta..'>:ation for the payment of a reward for past military service is valid, 
being for a "public purpose." The theory is that such a reward is an incen-
tive to patriotism and to patriotic service in the future. See 18 MICH. L. 
REV. 535. The court said that the payment of money to an individual is not 
a gift within the meaning of the constitutional limitations, set forth above, 
if made in recognition of a moral or equitable obligation on, the part of the 
state to the individual. 1lfmzro v. State, 223 N. Y. 208. It held, however, 
that there was no moral obligation on the part of the state to pay extra 
compensation to the contemplated beneficiaries, first, because any claim 
which may exist is a national and not a state obligation, inasmuch as the 
national government was the sole actor in all matters pertaining to military 
service; and secondly, because the performance of military service is merely 
the fulfillment of a citizen's obligation to his country, and hence any com-
pensation over the regular military pay isi a mere gratuity. Neither of these 
reasons seems sound. The court of New York has recognized the state's 
"moral obligation" to make some sort of recompense to a state employee 
who was injured through an unforeseen accident while acting in his employ-
ment, .Munro v. State, 223 N. Y. 208; to one who had rendered personal 
services to the state, Cole v. State, 102 N. Y. 48; to volunteer firemen who 
had served for a long time without pay, Trustees of Exempt Firemen's Benev. 
Fund v. Roome, 93 N. Y. 313; to one whose land was reduced in value by 
a change of the grade of a street, made under state authority. In re Borup, 
182 N. Y. 222. Is the case of the service man substantially different? Judge 
Cardozo, dissenting, said : "Their service has been coupled with sacrifice, 
and from the two there is born the equity that prompts to reparation." There 
would seem to be a pressing obligation to distribute the burden of these 
pecuniary losses more equitably over society, to give a proportionate share 
to those who remained at home reaping the harvest of war wages and war 
profits. Does the obligation rest solely upon the national government? 
See State v. Clausm (Wash., 1921), 194 Pac. 793, to the effect that the 
state has a moral obligation to compensate for military services rendered 
to the federal government. See also Second Employers' Liability Cases, 
223 U. S. I, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 44; Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U. S. 34; State 
v. Ha11dli1i, 38 S. D. 550. According to its own statement, the court was 
not forgetful of the rule that if there is any reasonable ground for the legis-
lative decision that a moral obligation exists the court cannot interfere. 
U. S. v. Realty Co., 163 U. S. 427; Opinion of the lilstices, 175 Mass. 599. 
CONSTITUTIONAL LA.w-StARCH AND St1zUM-S:i;:r.F-lNCRillIINATioN.-
Some detectives employed by a private corporation searched the petitioner's 
office and seized his books and papers. These were turned over to the 
Attorney General's office to be used as evidence in a prosecution of the 
petitioner for fraudulent use of the mails. The district court had ordered 
the return of the books and papers, although the court stated that the pos-
session of the stolen property was not the result of any unlawful act on 
the part of anybody representing the government of the United States. 
Upon appeal by the agent of the Attorney General, held, that the retention 
354 MICHIGAN LAW REVlEW 
of this evidence violated neither· the Fourth nor the Fifth Amendments to 
the Constitution. Bitrdeait v. McDowell (1921), 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 574. 
The court said that while the petitioner would have a clear right of 
action against those who wrongfully took his property, still the Fourth 
Amendment was not involved, because it was intended as a restraint only 
upon governmental agencies. The mere retention of the evidence did not 
make the government guilty of a wrongful search and seizure. This ques-
tion seems not to have been decided before. Previous cases involving the 
search and seizure amendment were concerned! with an actual taking by 
some governmental authority, and' the questions raised were whether the 
acts were unreasonable or whether they were authorized by the person 
whose property was taken. In one case certain letters were taken by two 
Chinese witnesses for the government in a federal prosecution. It was 
held that there was not an unlawful search and seizure, because the letters 
were not addressed to the defendant from whom it was claimed that they 
were taken unlawfully. But the question whether these witnesses were 
government agents was not discussed, as it seems it might have been. Moy 
Wing Smi v. Prentis, 234 Fed. 24- The Fourth Amendment does not 
expressly confine the security of the persons, houses, papers and effects of 
people to security against unreasonable searches and seizures by govern-
ment officers, although it does prescribe the manner of issuing warrants for 
searches and seizures which shall be regarded as lawful. But this interpre-
tation appears reasonable when it is remembered that the origin of this con-
stitutional provision was the abuse of executive authority. Coor.1w, CoNsTI-
'rUTIONAI. LIMITATIONS (Ed. 6), p. 364 ff. 
The court held that the Fifth Amendment was not violated by the 
retention of the evidence, when the government had no part in the unlawful 
taking. The reason assigned was that the government could require the 
production of this evidence by subpoena, when informed of its existence in 
the hands of a third person, and the petitioner could not regain its posses-
sion. However, when there has been an unlawful search and seizure, it 
now appears settled that the owner of books and' papers wrongfully seized 
can recover them in· a timely and direct proceeding, although the views 
expressed in Adams v. New York, 192 U. S. 585, threw some doubt upon 
this right. See 20 MICH. L. R.Ev. 93, !08. And in Silverthorne Lumber Co. 
v. United States, 25I U. S. 385, it was held that the government could not 
subsequently acquire evidence by subpoena if its knowledge of its existence 
was derived from its wrongful search and seizure. The principal case 
decides that the government may retain the incriminating evidence if it is 
but a step removed from the wrongdoer. And .it is not necessary that the 
evidence should have been acquired by regular subpoena process. Justices 
Brandeis and Holmes dissented on the ground that tfie lack of regular process 
in acquiring the evidence placed government officials in an exceptional posi-
tion before the law, and such irregularity would not encourage respect for 
law and government. It may be that this consideration will induce the 
Supreme Court to change from its position in the principal case, as it seems 
to have done in that taken in the Adams case. 
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CONTRACTS-LEGALITY OF A CoNTRAC'l' TO RAISE A Bm AT AN AUCTION 
SALE.-Defendant agreed that if the plaintiff woul<l' raise the bid on certain 
land put up at auction from $Io,250 to $n,275 he would give the plaintiff 
one half of the raised bids. Plaintiff raised the bid to $u,275. The land 
was knocked down to the plaintiff for $n,830. Plaintiff brings this action 
to recover one half of the difference between $n,275 and $n,830. Held, as 
plaintiff had broken the contract by selling the bid, he could not recover. 
Jem1iugs v. Jennings (N. C., 192I), rn8 S. E. 340. 
The usual definition of a puffer is the one given in Peck v. List, 23 W. 
Va. 338, where it is said that a puffer is "one who, without having any 
intention to purchase, is employed by the vendor at an auction to raise the 
price by fictitious bids, thereby increasing competition among bidders, while 
he himself is secured from risk by a secret understanding with the vendor 
that he shall not be bound by his bids." The plaintiff in the principal case 
made the bid with the intention of buying. This, however, should not pre-
vent the plaintiff from being regarded as a puffer, if the bid was made 
because of the inducement held out to him by the vendor, since the impliecli 
warranty to the public that the price would not be screwed up by secret 
machinery waSt broken. Whether the employment of a puffer by the vendor 
at an auction sale is a fraud or not is in conflict. A majority of the courts 
in this country hold that the use of a puffer, when no reservations are made, 
is a fraud upon the public, because the purchaser at such a sale is entitled 
to buy at an under value if he can do so, and that such a contrivance by 
way of puffing deprives him of this right. Peck v. List, supra; 13I A. S. R. 
488, and cases there cited. The minority opinion is that the vendor may 
employ one puffer if he does it for the purpose of preventing a sale at a 
sacrifice and not as a mere pretext for enhancing the price above the true 
value. Rey11olds v. Dechattms, 24 Tex. 174; Davis v. Petway, 3 Head 
(Tenn.) 667. This conflict in the American decisions is due to the differ-
ent rules which were applied by the courts of equity and of law in England. 
See 131 A. S. R. 488. The agreement in the principal case was a fraud, 
according to the majority rule, as a matter of Jaw; while according to the 
minority rule it was a question for the jury to say whether or not the agree-
ment was to prevent a sacrifice of the property put up. In both jurisdic-
tions, however, if a fraud had been worked upon the public the plaintiff 
could not recover a share of the raised bids, because the contract, being for 
the purppse of defrauding the purchaser and against public policy, was ille-
gal and unenforceable. Dealey v. East San Mateo Land Co., 21 Cal. App. 39; 
Walker y. Nightingale, 3 Bro. P. C. 263. The.conclusion at which the court 
in the principal case arrived seems sound; but the plaintiff might have been 
denied relief on the ground that he was a puffer, and as such could not 
recover on the contract. 
CoNTRAC'l's-Mu'!·uAL ASSENT-EFFEC'l' OF AN UNDERSTANDING THAT AN 
ORAL AGREEMENT IS TO BE Rmuc:ED To WruTING.-Through their respective 
brokers, the plaintiff and defendant entered into an oral agreement for the 
chartering of plaintiff's vessel. The defendant refused to execute a formal 
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charter party or to charter the ship, and plaintiff sued for damages resulting 
from such refusal. Held, an enforceable contract had been entered into by 
the parties, though both intended it should be reduced to writing and signed 
Americmi Hawaiimi S. S. Co. v. Willf1eehr et al. (1921), 274 Fed. 214 
"It is everywhere agreed to be possible for parties to enter into a bind-
ing informal or oral agreement to execute a written contract. It is also 
everywhere agreed that if the parties contemplate a reduction to writing of 
their agreement before it can b€ considered complete there is no contract 
until the writing is signed." WlLLIS'.rON ON CoN'l'RACTS, Sec. 28. Between 
_ these two clear situations ambiguous ones arise which lead to differences 
of opinion. The ultimate question in such cases, however, is one of fact as 
to the intention of the parties. If the written draft is viewed simply as a 
convenient record of an existing agreement, its absence does not affect the 
binding force of the agreement, there being no regulation by statutes; but 
if it is viewed as an essential part of, and a consummation of, the negotia-
tions, there is no contract until the written draft is executed. Miss., etc., 
Steamship Co. v. Swift, 86 Me. 248; Westem Roofing Tile Co. v. Jones, 26 
Okla. 209; El Reno Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Stocking, 293 Ill. 494; Prince 
v. Blisard (Texas, 1919), 210 S. W. 301. See 29 L. R. A. 431 et seq. In 
some cases the fact that the parties contemplated that a formal agreement 
should be prepared and signed has been regarded as "some evidence" that 
they did not intend to bind themselves until the agreement was reduced to 
writing and signed; in others it has been considered "strong evidence" of 
such a conclusion. Wharton v. Stoutenburgh, 35 N. J. Eq. 266; Rossiter v. 
Miller [1878], 3 App. Cas. n24; Ridgway v. Wharto1i, 6 H. of L. Cas. 264 
See 29 L. R. A. 437; Ann. Cas. 1912 B 131. In the principal case, and similar 
ones, where an enforceable contract has been held to have been made with-
out the execution of the formal contract, it is at least impliedly recognized 
that the mere reference to such future formal contract does not negative 
the existence of a present contract. The court in the principal case consid-
ered that the plaintiff had shown an intention on the part of the parties to 
be bound by the oral agreement, and had sustained the burden of proof said 
to be upon him to sustain such a contention, particular notice being given 
to the fact that the defendant's manager had actually designated a place for 
the ship to dock. 
CON'l'RACTS-ORAL v ARIA'l'ION OF WRIT'mN AGREEMENT Wl'l'HlN S'l'A'l'U'l'E 
OF FRAuDs-EsroPPEL.-In a written agreement defendant promised to sell 
plaintiff a certain 48ci acres of patented land, and, inter alia, to sell plaintiff 
100 head of cattle to be selected by plaintiff out of defendant's herd. Plain-
tiff paid $soo down. A day or two after the execution of the agreement, and 
nearly a month before defendant was to perform, he discovered that he could 
not pass a clear title to a part of the land. Accordingly, the parties entered 
into an oral adjustment as to this. While defendant was holding the cattle 
to be ready to perform he had' opportunities to sell them. Before the date 
of performance a severe drought occurred, causing him heavy losses on his 
animals. On the date of performance plaintiff refused to complete pay-
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ment and now sues for the recovery of his deposit, claiming that the defend-
ant is barred from setting up the revised contract because it does not satisfy 
the Statute of Frauds. Judgment given for the defendant. Held, the plaintiff 
was estopped. to set up the statute as to the variation. Vaugha1i v. Jackson 
(N. Mex., 1921), 200 Pac. 425. 
In arriving at its decision the court quotes from Kingstoti v. Walters, 
16 N. Mex. 59, saying: "Where a representation as to the future relates to 
an intended abandonment of an existing right and is made to influence others 
and they have been influenced by it to act, it operates aSj an estoppel." This 
doctrine can be traced to Insurance Co. v. Mowry, g6 U. S. 544, but it is 
unnecessary to the decision of that case and is a misleading dictmn. In the 
principal case, however, the court was forced to resort to some device such 
as estoppel. By the great weight of authority no action will lie on an oral 
variation of a written contract if the varied agreement is within the Statute 
of Frauds. Odell v. Barton, 249 Fed. 6o4; Swain v. Seamens, 9 Wall. 254; 
Abell v. Mimso1i, 18 Mich. 305. A contract within the Statute may be 
rescinded orally. Morris v. Baron & Co., 87 L. J. R. (K. B.) 145. But as 
was said in this case, it is essential that in the agreement for rescission there 
be made manifest "the intention in any event of a complete extinction of the 
first and formal contract, and not merely the desire of an alteration, how-
ever sweeping, in terms which still leaves it subsisting." See also Morris v. 
Baron & Co. [1918], A. C. 1, commented on in 16 MICH. L. REv. 624 Appar-
ently many courts refuse to allow any application of estoppel to avoid the 
Statute of Frauds. Warren v. Mayer Mfg. Co., 16I Mo. n2; Platt v. Butcher, 
II2 Cal. 634. But the better rule seems to be that one who. has induced a 
breach by requesting performance to be different from that called for in 
the written contract is estopped to set up this breach. The leading case taking 
this view is Hickman v. Haynes, L. R. IO C. P. 5g8, in which it was held 
that a buyer having by parol induced a seller, willing and able to perform, 
to delay until after the time called for in the written contract was barred 
from setting up the breach. In accord are Paxton v. Faxo1i, 28 Mich. 159; 
Johnsoti v. Blair, 132 Ala. 128; Scheerschmidt v. Smith, 74 Minn. 224. 
Tlzo111so1i v. Poor, 147 N. Y. 402, goes further and says that the party who 
has consented· to a different performance is estopped to assert that there 
was a breach; but there is strong authority contrary to this extension. Wal-
ter v. Bloede, 94 Md. So. The principal case must rely on the disputed doc-
trine that estoppel will apply as against the party merely assenting to a 
request for a change in performance; but even conceding this to be the 
law, the court's decision is erroneous. Where courts allow estoppel at all, 
the party claiming its benefit must have been able to perform according to 
the terms of the written contract and must have withheld such performance 
on the faith of the other party's conduct. Stowell v. Robinson, 3 Bing. N. C. 
928; Lawyer v. Post, 109 Fed. 512; Plevins v. Downing, l C. P. D. 220 (dic-
tum); Hasbrouck v. Tappe1i, 15 Johns. (N. Y.) 200. In the principal case 
it was impossible for the vendor to deliver a good patent title to the land 
in question. Not having relied on the plaintiff's conduct as to acts which 
he was able to perform, he is not entitled to the benefit of estoppel to deny 
breach. 
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CoNTRAC'l'S-STATUTE oF FRAUDS-ORAL Rssc1ss10N oF CoNTRAC'l' TO CoN-
VEY LAND.-Defendant, by written contract, agreed to convey real estate to 
X, payment to be made in installments. After X had made some payments 
an oral agreement was entered into whereby X surrendered the written con-
tract in consideration of defendant paying back the installments paid. Plain-
tiff, as administrator of X, brought action, demanding specific performance 
of the 4:ontract or damages. Held, the oral agreement rescinded the written 
agreement to convey land and• that it was not such an agreement as under 
the Statute of Frauds would need to be in writing. W angsness v. Stephenson 
(S. D., 1921), 184 N. W. 362. 
The general rule seems to be that if an executory contract is within the 
Statute of Frauds and is in writing a subsequent oral agreement fo rescind 
the contract is effectual, provided the oral agreement fulfills the requisites 
- of a contract at common law. WILI.ISTON ON CoNTR.ACTS, Sec. 592. But 
whether an executory contract creates an "interest" in the land on the part 
of the buyer and whether a rescission of the contract is such a retransfer 
as to require a writing is a much disputed question. The court in the prin-
cipal case follows a line of cases which holds that the oral agreement dis-
charging the written contract need not be in writing. Morris v. Baron 
[1918], A. C. I (semble); Wttlsclmer v. Ward, II5 Ind. 219; Howard v. 
Gresham,, 27 Ga. 347; Morrill v. Colehoitr, 82 Ill. 6!8. But it seems that 
these courts fail to see that an equitable interest in the land has been created 
by the contract. It is well settled that a promise to sell an equitable interest 
in real estate is within the statute. Elli.s v. Hill, 162 Ill. 557; Spragite v. 
Kimball, 213 Mass. 380; Tynan v. Warren, 53 N. J. Eq. 313; Holmes v. 
Holmes, 86 N. C. 205. Thus, a contract to mortgage real estate must be in 
writing. Stringfellow v. Ivie, 73 Ala. 209; Marshall v. Livermore Water Co. 
(Cal.), 5 Pac. IOI; Clabaitgh v. Byerly, 7 Gill (Md.) 354. So, also, courts 
have held that an assignment of a contract to convey land must be in writing 
because it creates an equitable ownership in the purchaser. Connor v. Tip-
pett, 57 Miss. 594; Hack~tt v.1 Watts, 138 Mo. 502; Meason v. Kaine, 63 Pa. 
335. In the principal case, when the owner contracted to sell his land he 
parted with sufficient rights of ownership to be called an equitable interest 
in the land. Therefore, an oral rescission of the contract, thereby restoring 
the equitable right to him who created it, should be within the statute just 
the same as if the equitable right had been conveyed. Barrett v. Durbin, 
rn6 Ark. 332; Catlett v. Dougherty, 21 Ill. App. u6; Dial v. Crain, IO Tex. 
444; Grnnow v. Salter, II8 Mich. 148. See WILI.ISTON ON CoNTRAC'l'S, Sec. 491. 
CoRPORAT'IONS-CHARTER AS A CONTRACT BETWEEN THE STATE AND THI! 
CoRPORATION.-In the year 1816 the Massachusetts legislature granted a char· 
ter to a religious society by a special act, reserving no power of repeal or 
amendment; nor was there any general law in force at that time reserving 
to it that power. In 1921 a bill was proposed in the legislature to suspend 
the charter of the society. Upon its opinion being asked by the Sen~te, the 
supreme court answered that the bill was in violation of Art. 1, Sec. 10, of 
the United' States Constitution, which declares that "no state shall * * * 
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pass any * * * law impairing the obligation of contracts." The grant and 
acceptance of the charter constituted a contract between the commonwealth 
and the society which the former could not violate. In re Opinion of the 
Justices (Mass., I!)2I), I3I N. E. 29. 
This doctrine was laid down in Massachusetts as early as I8o6, in Wales 
v~ Stetso1i, 2 Mass. I43· But by far the leading case on the subject is Trus-
tees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward (I8I9), 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 5I8, I 
WILGUS CoRP. CASES 7o8, which Chief Justice Waite said had become so 
imbedded in our jurisprudence as to be "to all intepts and purposes part of 
the Constitution itself." Stone~ v. Mississippi, IOI U. S. 8I4, 2 Wn.Gus CoRP. 
CASES I348. The doctrine, however, has not been free from attack. See 
Toledo Bank v. Bond, I Ohio St. 622; Dow v. Northem Railroad, 67 N. H. I. 
When charters of private corporations were granted by special legislative 
acts, as in the Dartnumth College case, the grant could quite readily be inter-
preted as giving rise to a contract between the state and the corporation. 
The act conferring corporate powers is in the nature of an offer on the part 
of the state which may be revoked at any time before acceptance. State v. 
Dawso1i, I6 Ind. 40, I Wn.Gus CoRP. CASES 4I2. Upon acceptance, the implied 
agreement of the corporation to perform the duties imposed upon it is an 
adequate consideration, and a binding contract is formed. Now, although 
corporations are formed under general laws, this contract still arises. Abbott 
v. The Jolmstoti, etc., Ry. Co., 8o N. Y. 27. In most states, as in Massa-
chusetts (R. L. I902, c. 109, Sec. 3), the power to repeal and amemf is now 
reserved to the legislature by a general law. It becomes a term of the char-
ters, without reference to it, of all corporations subsequently organized. 
Thornton v. Marginal Freight Ry. Co., I23 Mass. 32. But the charter in the 
principal case was granted fifteen years before the Massachusetts statute 
became operative, and' a case is presented which is becoming more and more 
uncommon. The decision shows no tendency on the- part of the court to . 
break away from the Dartmouth College case, but to adhere strictly to its 
doctrine. See also 4 MICH. L. JoUR. 25I; 4 MICH. L. REV. 3o6; 7 ibid. 64, 
201, 591 ; 9 ibid. 225. 
CRIMES-CONSPIRACY-INDIC'.l'MEN'l'.-In a prosecution for conspiracy to 
violate the National Prohibition Act, the indictment charged with conspiracy 
thirty-one named persons, together with divers other persons to the grand 
jurors unknown. Proffered evidence would have shown that some of the 
"other persons" were known to the grand jurors .. Held, there was no error 
in the rejection of the evidence, since no necessity exists for joining or 
naming all the conspirators in a single indictment. United States v. Heitler, 
274 Fed. 401. 
A true averment that the names of the other conspirators are to the 
grand jury unknown has always been held sufficient. People v. Mather, 4 
Wend. 229; Cooke v. People, 23I Ill. 9. But, furthermore, it is never incum-
bent on the prosecution to charge all who have participated in the unlawful 
undertaking, People v. Richards, 67 Cal. 412; nor is it necessary to allege 
the names of all the parties to the conspiracy. State v. Lewis, I42 N. C. 626; 
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contra, State v. Dreany, 65 Kan. 292. And even where it is requi~ed that the 
names of all the parties to the conspiracy be alleged, it is not essential to 
the sufficiency of the indictment that all such parties be jointly charged with 
the commission of the offense. State v. Dreany, supra. When, as in the 
principal case, the indictment charges the defendants therein named with 
having conspired "with divers other persons to the said grand jurors 
unknown,'' and it appears by the proof that such other persons are known 
to the grand jury, the question arises as to whether this averment is a mate-
rial one and the variance fatal. On this point the courts have quite uni-
formly held that the variance is not fatal and that the names of the parties 
with whom the indicted defendants conspired are not descriptive of the 
offense. Jones v. United States, 179 Fed. 584; People v. Smith, 239 Ill. 91; 
People v. Mather, supra. Thus, it follows that the averment is mere sur-
plusage. The court in the principal case subscribes to this view, but, as it 
points out, quoting from the opinion in Cochran v. United States, 157 U. S. 
286: "The true test is, not whether it (the indictment) might possibly have 
been made more certain, but whether it contains every element of the offense 
intended to be charged, and sufficiently apprises the defendant of what he 
must be prepared to meet." 
Evm.t::NcE-0PINION BY AN ExPERT \'VITNESS ON "THE VERY Issu:e'' INAD-
MISSIBLt.-D had been convicted of murder and sentenced to death. Pur-
suant to a statute which provided for a stay of execution until recovery of 
persons becoming insane between conviction and execution, D's counsel peti-
tioned that a jury be impaneled to try D's sanity. By the court's order three 
alienists e.."amined D and at the hearing without a jury were permitted to 
express their opinion as to D's sanity at the time of the examination. On 
a writ of error it was held, that there should be another hearing before a 
jury and that the opinions of the experts should, not be received on the very 
question the jury were to pass upon. People v. Geary (Ill., 1921), 131 N. 
E. 652. 
Although the issue. is a bit beclouded by the suggestion that hypothetical 
questions might properly be asked the experts, the question~ of the admissi-
bility of an expert's opinion upon "the very issue" seems to be fairly raised. 
Authority for the decision may be found in C. & A. R. Co. v. R. Co., 67 Ill. 
145; Goddard v. Enzler, 222 Ill. 462; and Keefe v. Armoier & Co., 258 Ill. z8. 
But even the Illinois court is not consistent. The issue in the instant case 
is precisely the same as in the hearing on a petition to have a conservator 
appointed for an alleged insane person. In such a case it has been held 
that the opinion of a lay witness who was well acquainted witbi the respond-
ent was admissible. Neely v. Shephard, 190 Ill. 637. The essence of the 
objection is that such opinions usurp the function of the jury. However, 
the jury is always at liberty to question not only the facts upon which the 
opinion is based but also the soundness of the opinion. The reason for admit-
ting expert opinion in matters of skill and science is to help the jury in 
determining facts with which the layman is unfamiliar. This help is equally 
useful whether one or several issues are to be tried. Many cases have held 
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that the coincidence of the question with the very issue in the case is not 
per sea ground for exclusion. Fenwick v. Bell, l C. & K. 312; ~Mansell v. 
Clements, L. R. 9, C. P. 139; Ryder v. State, 100 Ga. 528; Poole v. Dea1i, 
152 Mass. 589; Donnelly v. R. Co., 70 Minn. 278; Nebomie v. R. Co., 68 N. 
H. 296; Littlejo/m v. Shaw, 159 N. Y. 188; Western Coal & M. Co. v. Ber-
berich, 94 Fed. 329. See WIGMO~ oN EVIDENCE, §1921. 
LIEN-Loss BY LmNoR.'s ATrACHMEN'l'.-The holder of a statutory lien 
for repairs on a motor boat in his possession sued out an attachment to 
enforce payment of the charges due. The sheriff levied on the property in 
pursuance of this process, lienor retaining physical possession of the boat 
and giving the officer a receipt for it. Held, that by causing an attachment 
to be levied on the property the lienor had waived his lien. Fidelity and 
Deposit Co. v. Johnson (1921), 275 Fed. n2. 
A "lien is neither a jus ad rem nor a jus in re, but a simple right of 
retainer. The voluntary parting with possession of goods will amount to 
a waiver or surrender of the lien." Sensenbrenner v. Mathews, 48 Wis. 250. 
In England as early as 1828 it was held that the lienor himself, having called 
on the sheriff to sell his security, he set up no lien against the sale, and 
although the property never left his physical pos'session because he purchased 
it from the sheriff, he held possession by virtue of the sale and not by virtue 
of the lien. Jacobs v. Latour, 5 Bing. 130. In the United States, Massa-
chusetts and Iowa have gone deepest into the subject. The Massachusetts 
view seems to be that the lienor loses his lien by surrendering to the attach-
ing officer, unless he specifically reserves his lien. Swett v. Brown, 5 Pick. 
178; Townsend v. Newell, 14 Pick. 332; Legg v. Willard, 17 Pick. 140; 
Whitaker v. Sm1mer, 20 Pick. 399; Evans v. Warren, 122 Mass. 303. Sub-
stantially the same view is taken by Iowa, although it does not appear that 
a lien may be reserved there through notice to the attaching officer. In 
reconciling the decisions in this state which hold that a statutory mate-
rial man's lien is not lost through attachment, the court says in Stein v. 
llfcAuley, 147 Iowa 630: "If a lien depends upon possession and continued 
possession is essential to the lien, the party holding such lien cannot surren-
der his possession through an attachment and then assert his lien. Citi:mi's 
Bank v. Dows, 68 Iowa 46o." Contra are Arendale v. Morgan & Co., 5 
Sneed. (Tenn.) 703; Lambert v. Nicklass, 45 W. Va. 527; Jones et al. v. 
lro1iton Garage Co. 9 Ohio App. 431, which take the view that the lienor 
does not lose his\ lien even if it is of such a nature as to depend on posses-
sion. In the latter two important cases the court fails to recognize that 
under the facts legal possession passed out of the lienor by the attachment. 
The reasoning of the West Virginia court on this point is the more plausible, 
this tribunal assuming that the officer took possession as the lienor's agent, 
so that possession did not leave the lienor. But the broad contention that 
this agency exists is contrary to authority. The attaching officer is the agent 
of the plaintiff only if the writ served is void on its face; otherwise he is 
not the agent of the plaintiff, but the agent of the law. Wilosn v. Tummon, 
I D. & L. 513. Goods, when properly attached, are strictly in the custody 
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of the law and the creditor has no right of possession of the attached goods. 
Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Love, 6r Kan. 433; Dollins & Co. v. Lindsey & 
Co., 89 Ala. 2r7; Stemmons & Hyatts v. Kfag, 8 B. Mon. (Ky.) 559. Though 
the lienor may hold physical possession of the goods, he may have it only 
as the agent of the officer. An attaching officer need not retain possession 
of the good's, but may deliver it to a keeper or agent, whose possession will 
be regarded as that of the officer. Sinsheim<{!r v. Whitely et al., III Cal. 378. 
But a lien is not lost through a delivery of possession with a special agree-
ment not to prejudice the lien. De Witt. v. Prescott, 51 Mich. 298; Gregory 
v. Morris, 96 U. S. 6r9. This holds good even in case of a sale. Gregory 
v. Morris, supra. Accordingly, if. the lienor specifically reserves his lien 
when he surrenders possession to the officer there is no reason why he should 
lose it. The case of Newell v. Smmzer, supra, can be explained as showing 
this phase of the principle as laid down in the supreme court decision of 
Gregory v. Morris, sztpra. But if there is no specific reservation of the lien 
there is little rea-son to imply one. In the West Virginia case, supra, in 
which this is done, the court stresses the point that an attachment is neces-
sary to make the lien right of any practical value. But in this case the plain-
tiff reversed the proper order of procedure. Because of his lien, no one could 
take the property away from him without paying the lien charges, and so he 
was amply protected until he should take possession of it, after suit on the 
debt, by a judgment levy. Thus, in the principal case the lienor's action was 
premature if its sole purpose was to enforce lien rights practically. 
SALES-MEANING OF THE WoRD SALE.-The transfer of the assets of 
corporation A to a newly 0 rganized corporation B in return for stock in 
corporation B at 90 per cent of the face value, held, a "sale" within a con-
tract entitling the manager to a certain per cent of the net profits on the 
sale of the company within a certain period. Board111a1i Co. v. Petch (Cal., 
r92r), r99 Pac. ro47. 
Blackstone defines a sale as a transmutation of property from one man 
to another in consideration of some price or recompense in value. Bk. 2 
Br.,. CoM. 446. In construing statutes which use the word "sale," a strict 
interpretation is sometimes given, holding that the word "sale" imports a 
money consideration. So where a statute prohibited the "sale" of intoxi-
cating liquors, giving liquor to one who returned other liquor of the same 
kind and amount did not constitute a sale. Jones v. State, ro8 Miss. 530. 
Accord, exchange of oleomargarine, Ewers v. Weaver, r82 Fed. 7r3. But 
to constitute a sale in its broader sense, the consideration need not neces-
sarily be money, for if title is transferred for a fixed money price, whether 
it be paid in cash or in goods, it is a sale. Ullma1i v. Land, 37 Tex. Civ. App. 
422. In a popular sense, the word "sale" is often used in a still broader 
sense and includes those transactions where an exchange of goods is made 
without reckoning their value in terms of money. Mosely v. Gordo1i, r6 Ga. 
384. The broad or narrow meaning of the word will be adopted in a given 
case as will best effectuate the intent of those using the word, and this 
intent may be indicated by the context or the surrounding circumstances 
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and the conduct of the parties. Keith v. Electrical Co., 136 Cal. 178; Mans-
field v. District Agr. Ass'1i, 154 Cal. 145. In the principal case the court held 
that the~e was evidence sufficient to justify a conclusion by the jury that 
the transaction constituted a "sale" of the property within the meaning of 
that term as used by the parties in their agreement. 
TAXA'l'lON-"Do1NG Busrnr:ss."-Decedent, a wealthy non-resident, organ-
ized two corporations (one in New Jersey, the other in New York, both 
having main offices in New York city) to relieve her of some of her busi-
ness, and transferred to them, on credit, about $24000,000 worth of securities 
and mortgages. She retained 63/125 of the stock in the New Jersey cor-
poration (giving most of the balance to her son)~ and although not a stock-
holder in the New York corporation, the capital stock was held in her inter-
est. At the time of her death in 1916 the decedent held a $55,ooo mortgage 
on New York property and savings deposits at interest and credits in New 
York banks and trust companies aggregating about $13,000,000. The Transfer 
Tax Law, Sec. 220, subd. 2, imposes a tax upon the property of a decedent 
"'"When the transfer is by will or intestate law of capital invested in business 
in the state by a non-resid'ent of the state doing business in the state either 
as principal or partner." Held, decedent was not "doing business" in the 
state within the Transfer Tax Law. In re Gree17/s Estate (May, 1921), 23r 
N. Y. 237. 
Concededly, the corporations were "doing business" in New York, and 
the decedent had capital invested in both of them. But unless the business 
carried on by a corporation can be held to be that of its individual stock-
holders, the corporations' activities in selling securities, making investments, 
loaning money, etc., would not warrant classifying the decedent as one 
"d'oing business" in New York. In an English case Lord Denman, C. J., said: 
"But as the case stands, it seems to us that the British corporation is, to all 
intents, the legal owner of the vessel, and entitled to the registry, and that 
we cannot notice any disqualification of an individual member which might 
disable him, if owner, from registering the vessel in his own name." The 
Queen, etc., v. Arnaud, 16 L. J. R. N. S. (Com. Law) 50. A recent New 
York decision was to the same effect. Schulz Co. v. Raimes & Co., 166-N. 
Y. Supp. 567, 100 Misc. Rep. 697. In that case 47/50 of the stock of a New 
Jersey corporation was owned by alien enemies; but the court concluded 
that it had no right to look behind the corporate entity to determine its char-
acter, so it did not have to decide whether or not an alien enemy could: sue 
in our courts. See also Peoples Pleasure P. Co. v. Rohleder, 109 Va. 439. 
The facts in Daimler Co. v. Co1itfoental Tyre and Ritbber Co., House of 
Lords [1916], 2 A. C. 307, were similar to those in Schulz Co. v. Raines & 
Co., supra, but it was held that the action could not be maintained. Although 
some of the lords believed they had a right to look behind the corporate 
entity to discover its character, it might well be said that the decision rested 
upon the unanimous opinion of the Lords that the secretary who brought 
suit for the corporation had no authority to do so. Whether or not holding 
the mortgage and thei deposits and credits in banks and trust companies con-
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stituted "doing business" in the state presents a more difficult problem. The 
Supreme Court of the United States defines "doing business" as "That which 
occupies the time, attention, and labor of men for the purpose of a livelihood 
or profit." Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107. Disposing of fifteen 
different cases, the court held that each of the following amounted to "doing 
business" : managing and leasing a hotel; leasing ore lands for mining, and 
receiving a royalty; owning and leasing taxicabs, and collecting rents there-
from. In Voii Battmbach v. Sargent Land Co., 242 U. S. 503, leasing and 
selling land and disposing of stumpage was held to be "doing business." 
Courts usually decide that merely holding title to property and distributing 
the income to stockholders is not "doing business." Zonne v. JJ1inneapolis 
Syndicate, 220 U. S. I87; United States v. Emery, Bird, Thayer Realty Co., 
237 U. S. 28. And if, in addition, the corporation is making investments, 
it is not "doing business." McCoach v. Minehill & S. H. R. Co., 228 U. S. 
295. Generally, a single transaction is not "doing business." Potter v. The 
Bank of Ithaca, 5 Hill 490; Cooper Manufactttring Co. v. Fergusoii, II3 U. 
S. 727; Florslieim Bros, D. G. Co. v. Lester, 6o Ark. !20. But see Boddy v. 
Contfoental Inv. Co. (Ala., 1921), 88 So. 294, where it is decided that "one 
transaction will constitute a doing of business." 
TORTS-LIABILITY OF MANUFACTURi;:R 'tO THIRD PARTY FOR INJURY CAUSllD 
BY UNSAF!l PRoouCT.-Plaintiff bought chicken feed from a grain company 
which was a purchaser and not a selling agent of defendant. The feed con-
tained too large a quantity of salt, and when fed to the plaintiff's chickens 
caused many of them to die. Held, that the plaintiff could not recover. 
Tompkins v. Qiwker Oats Co. (Mass., 1921), I3l N. E. 456. 
The court said, "it is a long established general rule that the manu-
facturer of an article is not liable to those who have no contractual relation 
with him for injuries resulting from negligence in its manufacture. This 
has been based on the various ·grounds of the absence of a legal duty to the 
plaintiff to use care in making the article, the break in the chain of legal 
causation, and the multiplicity of suits "thought likely to result if the action 
were allowed." The court points out the various exceptions to the general 
rule, such as negligence in the preparation of food for human consumption; 
where the product is inherently dangerous, or commonly recognized as dan-
gerous, to human life or health, such as poisonous drugs, etc. To the same 
effect is another recent Massachusetts case, Windram Mfg. Co. v. Boston 
Blacking Co. (I921), I3I N. E. 454, where the defendant manufactured 
cement for pasting linings t0, fabrics, such cement being deleterious in char-
acter and injurious to both the linings and the fabrics. In the case of Sclw-
bert v. Clark Co., 49 Minn. 331, the action was brought to recover for 
injuries resulting from a defective step-ladder, and the manufacturer was 
held liable. In that case the court seems to have considered a step-ladder 
to be of a dangerous character. An exhaustive review of the cases was 
there made, but they are mostly cases of the sale of drugs and food for 
human consumption. See, in this connection, the note to Craft v. Parker, 
Webb & Co., g6 Mich. 245, in 21 L. R. A. 139· See also note in 27 YAI.ll L. 
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J. 713. There seems to have been a tendency during the past few years to 
allow a recovery where the article manufactured, while not inherently dan-
gerous, will, if not properly constructed, be dangerous to life or health. 
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N. Y. 382; Johnson v. Cadillac Motor 
Car Co., 26! Fed. 878. A very valuable and comprehensive review of this 
entire question will be found in 18 MICH. L. R. 676. 
TRIAI. PRAC'l'IC£-DUTY oF COURT To !NSTRUC'l'.-The trial court refused 
to give certain requests of the plaintiff as instructions. On appeal the plain-
tiff complained of this action, while the defendant contended that since it 
did not appear from the record that the plaintiff had presented any requests 
to instruct, he could not now contend that there was error at the trial. 
Held, that the court is under a duty to instruct generally upon the issues 
raised, even in the absence of any requests to instruct. Sietherland v. Payne, 
274 Fed. 360. 
The original common law rule was that the judge was under an obliga-
tion, when charging the jury, to sum up the evidence produced on both sides 
and to explain the law of the subject and its application to the particular 
case. BRICKWOol>'s SAcKS'l"l', !NS'l'RUC'l'IONS (Ed. 3), Sec. 153. Statutory 
modifications of this rule are quite general in this country, but, aside from 
these, there has come about a decided diversity of judicial opinion as to the 
duty of the trial court to instruct the jury when not requested so to do. 
In accord with the principal case, see Central R. R. v. Harris, 76 Ga. 501; 
Mariner v. Smith, 66 Tenn. 423; Capital City Brick and Pipe Co. v. Des 
Moines, 136 Ia. 243; Pierson v. Smith, 2n Mich. 292. In Owe1~ v. Owen, 
22 Ia. 270, it is said : "It may be said that the counsel did not request instruc-
tions, and that therefore it was not obligatory on the court to give any. 
Such a view does not accord with our conception of the functions and duties 
of the judge. He should see that every case goes to the jury so that they 
have clear and intelligent notions of precisely what it is that they are to 
decide." At 'least, it is not reversible error for a trial court of its own 
motion to instruct the jury. Carey v. Callan's Ex'r, 45 Ky. 44- The other 
extreme is that the court is under no duty to present instructions to the jury 
unless requested. Tetherow v. St. Joseph & Des Moines Ry. Co., 98 Mo. 74; 
Burkholder v. Stahl, 58 Pa. 371; T. & P. Ry. Co. v. Volk, 151 U. S. 73; 
Stuckey v. Fritsche, 77 Wis. 329; Sears v. Atlantic C. L. R. Co., 178 N. C. 
285. As expressed in Owens v. Owens, supra, the theory that the judge 
should instruct, though no requests are presented, is more consonant with 
the idea of the duties and functions of a judicial officer. It may be con-
ceded that in most cases it is negligence for an attorney to fail to submit 
requests, yet the one who suffers by the contrary rule is not, primarily, the 
attorney, but the innocent client. While in matters of drawing pleadings, in 
introducing evidence, and in many other ways, the conduct of his case is in 
the hands of the attorney, and the client must suffer for his neglect or 
inefficiency, here, it would seem, is a case where the court should properly 
do its utmost to see that justice is done both parties. It seems almost self-
evident to say that the public maintains courts, not in order that appellate 
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courts may theorize on matters of waiver and negligence in the conduct ot 
causes in court, but_ that the jury may render a just verdict on the issues 
presented by the pleadings and evidence. Yet that consideration seems to 
be overlooked too often. Nor is it extreme to say that by submitting evi-
dence to sustain his side of the issues raised by the pleadings an attorney is 
impliedly requesting the court to submit the correct law on the issues thus 
presented. Of course, if a court has failed to instruct, or has instructed 
voluntarily but erroneously, and a verdict consistent with the law and evi-
dence is obtained, a reversal shoµld not be granted for that reason. Ford 
v. Lacey, 30 L. J. Ex. 351. Where a trial court has made a reasonable effort 
to present the law bearing on the issues, and a slight error has been com-
mitted, th~ cases are all in accord that, unless a party has made a request 
which would, if granted, have obviated such error, he is in no position to 
complain. This question may arise where some minor phase of the evidence 
has been overlooked by the judge or where unintentionally some phase of 
the adversary's case has been given undue prominence. N. P. R. R. Co. v. 
Mares, 123 U. S. 710; U. S. v. Goodloe,.204 Ala. 484; Livingstone v. Dole, 
.184 Ia. 1340; Mahiat v. Codde, 106 Mich. 387. There is good reason for this, 
as pointed out in 2 THOMPSON, TRIALS (Ed. 2), Sec. 2341: "* * * A party 
cannot, by merely excepting to a charge, make it the foundation for an 
assignment of error that it is indefinite or incomplete. The facts- of' the case 
come to the mind of the judge as matters of first impression, and' it will 
often be extremely difficult for him in the short time allowed for a trial 
before a jury, and in the midst of such a trial, to prepare a series of instruc: 
tions applicable to all the hypotheses presented by the evidence. * * *" 
TRIA:r. PRActlct-PLAIN'tlFF's RIGH't 'tO D1sM1ss.-In a suit in equity, 
after a hearing had been had before the chancellor, and he had foun'd that 
complainant had no grounds for equitable relief, complainant sought to dis-
miss, and was refused. The defendant insisted that final judgment be ren-
dered. This course was adopted below. On appeal, questioning the refusal 
to allow complainant to withdraw, held, a litigant has no absolute right to 
discontinue an action without the sanction of the court, either at law or in 
equity. Beaver v. Slane (Pa., 1921), n4 Atl. 509. 
It is often said that a plaintiff has an absolute right to dismiss his action 
before a certain stage in the trial has been\ reached. After verdict, the rule, 
almost without exception, is that a voluntary dismissal cannot be had. See 
cases, 18 C. ]. u53. There is- a contrariety of opinion as! to when that stage 
has been reached before verdict. At common law, originally, suit could be 
dismissed as a matter of right at least before verdict rendered. Ha111Ii1i 
v. Walker, 228 Mo. 6II. This rule apparently survives. Oil Co. v. Shore, 
171 N. C. 51; Denem v. Houghto1i County St. Ry. Co., 150 Mich. 235; U. S. 
v. N. & W. Ry. Co., n8 Fed. 554 Until the jury retires the plaintiff has 
an absolute right of dismissal. Burke v. Clticago City Ry. Co., 109 Ill. App. 
656. The right is absolute before a trial on the merits is begun. New Hamp-
shire Banking Co. v. Ball, 57 Kan. 812; Heineman v. Va1i Stone, 68 N. Y. S. 
803; McQueste1i v. Commonwealth, 1g8 Mass. 172. After such arbitrarily 
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fixed point in the progress of the case has been reached, it is still possible 
for the court in its discretion to allow the plaintiff to withdraw. Ashmead 
v. Ashmead, 23 Kan. 262; McQ1testm v. Commonwealth, s11pra; Bee Biiilding 
Co. v. Dalto1i, 68 Neb. 38. Other cases seem to ignore the line of distinction 
between absolute right and discretionary right, here suggested, and would 
make it in all cases a matter of discretion with the trial court. In Matter 
Waverly Water Works, 85.N. Y. 478; Isla11d Realty Co. v. U.S., 209'Fed. 
201. But if the defendant is not prejudiced there is no need for discretion 
and the plaintiff may voluntarily dismiss. A1idrews v. French, 17 N. M. 615. 
It is often said that a plaintiff has an absolute right to dismiss his action 
where there exists no special reason why the dismissal should not be granted. 
Deere & Webber Co. v. Hinckley, 20 S. D. 359. This and the discretion rule 
are too general, as it too frequently requires the final word of an appellate 
court to determine whether the discretion has been properly exercised, or 
whether or not special reasons exist. See La11e v. Morto1i, 81 N. C. 38; 
Steve11s v. The Railroads, 4 Fed. 97; Palmer v. D., L. & W. R. R., 222 Fed. 
461; Palmedo v, Walto1~ Reporter Co., 183 N. Y. S. 365. The use of condi-
tional orders of dismissal in such cases is common. Americaii Steel a11d Wire 
Co. v. Mayer & Englu11d Co., 123 Fed. 204 The principal case holds that a 
final decision on the merits had been reached, which precluded dismissal as 
of right, and that ordinarily, when all the evidence has been submitted, a 
dismissal will not be allowed. On the latter point, compare Levy v. Insurance . 
Co., 159 N. Y. S. 902, which ruled to the contrary on the same state of facts. 
TRusl's-Is 'l'HE Ci>s'l'ur's RtGHl' IN RE:i.r OR IN P£RSONA:r.i:?-The Ver-
mont tax appraisers levied a tax upon the cestui's interest in a trust estate 
consisting of certain securities. The cestui was a resident of Vermont and 
the trustee was a non-resident. The levy was protested on the ground that 
the cestui had no property within the state subject to taxation. Held, the 
equitable interest of the cestui is property which the legislature may subject 
to taxation. City of St. Albans v. Avery (Vt., 1921), 114 Atl. 31. 
The liability of a resident cestui to property taxation on the theory that 
he has a property interest within the state, even though the trustee is a non-
resident, is apparently fairly well settled. In Hunt v. Perry, 165 Mass . .287, 
the court sustained a· law imposing a personal property tax upon hillL In 
Mag11ire v. Ta:i: Commissioner, 230 Mass. 503, affirmed in 253 U. S. 12, he 
was subjected to a state income tax upon income derived from property 
held in trust by a non-resident trustee. These decisions are predicated on 
the theory that the cestui has a property interest in the trust estate in addi-
tion to the usual personal rights against the trustee. The interesting feature 
of the decision in the principal case is the unequivocal language with which 
the Vermont court repudiates the historic doctrine that the cestui's interest 
is merely i1i perso11am. It says: "The beneficiaries are the substantial own-
ers of the trust fund. They have the power to control absolutely the char-
acter of the securities comprisingi the fund and to terminate it at will. They 
actually owned the securities yesterday, so to speak, and may tomorrow if 
they so elect. * * * To say that, possessed of the interests and rights which 
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they have under the arrangement, they have no property, is absurd." The 
essence of rights in. rem is generality of claim against all the world; that 
of rights in personam is restriction of claim to a definite promisor. In the 
early days of uses the cestui's rights were purely in personam. However, 
they gradually expanded under the protection of the courts of chancery until 
in chronological succession the cestui acquired rights against purchasers with 
notice, the heirs of the trustee, the dower rights of the trustee's wife, and 
the trustee's creditors. This development would, without doubt, have gone 
on more rapidly, and would have been carried still further, had it not been 
for Lord Coke's jealousy for the common law and his antagonism to any 
extension of the powers of the courts of chancery. In his own words, "a 
use is only a trust or confidence reposed in some other which is not issuing 
out of the land but is a thing collateral, annexed in privity to the estate of 
the land and to the person touching the land. It is neither a jus fa re nor a jtis 
ad rem." Both courts andl text-writers have submitted to a greater or less 
extent to his legalistic reasoning, and even at the present day certain doc-
trines of trust law are predicated upon it. For instance, if the trustee is 
barred by the Statute of Limitations from an action against one who inter-
feres with the trust estate, the cestui is likewis.e barred, even though he be 
under a disability which would ordinarily toll the statute in his favor. 
Lewellfa v. Mackworth, 2 Eq. Cas. Ahr. 579; Wyclz. v. East India Co., 3 P. 
Wms. 309. If he were regarded as having an interest in rem in the trust 
estate, the statute would not bar his remedy. Again, the cestui has no direct 
remedy against the disseisor or converter of the trust estate. He must pro-
ceed in equity to compel the trustee to take the necessary action. Hall v. 
W aterma1i, 220 Ill. 56g. But the present tendency of the- law is clearly toward 
recognizing the cestui's right as a composite of in perso11am rights against 
the trustee and iii rem rights against all the world. See HusTON, ENFORct-
MENT OF DECREES IN EQUI'rY, Ch. 6, and I7 Cor.. L. R. 269 for thorough dis-
cussions of the subject. The principal case and others of its kind are good 
illustrations of the modem trend of thought and of its application in trust law. 
TRUSTS-P AROL TRUST IN LANDS-STATUTE OF FRAUDS-SUBSEQUENT 
ADMISSIONS IN COURT BY TRUSTtt.-The defendant was the grantee of lands 
by a deed absolute upon its face. The wife of the deceased grantor and the 
guardian of his minor son brought a petition to have the deed set aside on 
the ground that it was induced by the fraudulent representation that the 
conveyance was necessary to save the property. The defendant's answer 
denied the fraud and claimed absolute title in fee to the property. In open 
court, however, the defendant stated, and her position was explained and 
endorsed by her attorney, that she did not claim the property for herself, 
but held it in trust for the wife and child of the grantor, and asked that a 
trustee be appointed to carry out the trust. Held, that a trustee should be 
appointed to enforce the trust according to the defendant's evidence. Bren-
der v. Stratton (Mich., 1921), 184 N. W. 486. 
It has been regarded as objectionable that the grantee should be permitted 
to establish a trust in the same action in which the petitioner seeks to set 
RECENT IMPORT ANT DECISIONS 
aside the deed on the ground of fraud. In such a case it has been held that; 
the verified answer of the defendant is insufficient, although the court said 
it would be sufficient in case the action were to establish the trust. Hutch--
inson v. Tindall, 3 N. J. Eq. 357. In that case, however, there was no evi-
dence to support the answer and the court refused to accept an answer in 
avoidance as evidence in defendant's favor. In Brender v. Stratto1i, supra, 
the defendant's testimony was clear and convincing. The court was satisfied 
that the land was conveyed' upon trust. If the Statute of Frauds were satis-
fied, therefore, there was no difficulty in making out the trust. The writing 
to satisfy the Statute of Frauds need not contain "all the terms of the trust." 
I7 MICH. L. REv. 266. A subsequent writing satisfies the statute, since an 
oral trust in lands is not illegal. I3 HARV. L. REv. 6o8; BOGERT ON TRUSTS 
(I92I), 6I. Many of the forms which such declarations may take are stated 
in PERRY ON TRUSTS (Ed. 6), Sec. 82. A verified answer in chancery by the 
trustee is sufficient. Sclmmacher v. Draeger, I37 Wis. 6!8; Barroti v. Barron, 
:24 Vt. 375. A guardian's report is also sufficient. Snyder v. Snyder, 28o 
Ill. 467. No case has been found where the testimony of a guarantee was per-
mitted to set up an enforceable trust; and it has been held that such testi-
mony reduced to writing does not satisfy the statute. Hasshagen v. Hass-
hagen, 80 Cal. 5I4- However, pleadings signed by counsel are held to con-
stitute a sufficient memorandum. I9 MICH. L. REv. 752. In the principal 
case the court emphasized the fact that there was more than the oral testi-
mony of the defendant under oath. The defendant's attorney called the 
attention of the court to the nature of her claim, although there were no 
formal pleadings filed. The decision seems sound, as the disclosures made 
in formal court proceedings supply an equivalent of the solemnity contem-
plated by the Statute of Frauds. 
WILLS-RIGHT OF ACTION AS AN ESTATE ON WHICH To BASE JURISDICTION 
TO GRANT LE'!'l'ERS oF Am.UNISTRATION.-Decedent, at the time of his death, 
was a resident of Michigan. He suffered injury from the D railroad in 
Indiana and the injury resulted in hi~ death. An administrator was 
appointed in Indiana for the sole purpose of prosecuting a claim for dam-
ages. Held, a claim for damages for causing the death of a party is not 
assets within the meaning of the statute authorizing the granting of letters 
of administration in this state. Tri-State Loan and Trust Co. v. Lake Shore 
& M. S. Ry. Co. (Ind., I92I), 131 N. E. 523. 
The usual code provision is that an administrator for a non-resident may 
be appointed only in the county where he leaves assets. At common law, 
a cause of action for an injury to the person dies with the party injured. 
To determine whether a right of action for causing death is an asset of the 
intestate on which to base jurisdiction to grant letters of administration, 
the particular statute giving the right should control. If the statute con-
tinues the cause of action for the injury to the deceased in favor of his per-
sonal representative, or on account of the death gives a new cause of action 
for the benefit of the intestate's estate, the cases agree that this is an asset 
of the intestate's estate. A recent case so holding is that of St. Louis S. 
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W. Ry. Co. v. Smitha (Tex., 1921), 232 S. W. 494. There it was held that 
a right of action for injury and death under the Federal Employers' Liability 
Act was an estate on which administration might be granted. That act 
expressly provides that actions for injury should survive. Accord, Findlay 
v. Chi. & Grand Trunk Ry. Co., Io6 Mich. 700; In re Lowham/s Estate, 30 
Utah 436. But if the statute gives a new cause of action to the widow or 
next· of kin, even though it is to be enforced by the administrator of the 
intestate, the right logically is not an asset of the intestate's estate. The 
difficulty in many cases, when not expressly stated, is to determine whether 
the statute gives the right to the estate of the intestate or creates a right 
in the widow or next of kin. Indiana, Kansas, Nebraska, Iowa, and Minne-
sota have statutes practically identical. These statutes provide that if injury 
results in death the party causing the death shall be liable; the suit must 
be brought by the personal representative of the deceased·; the damages 
shall be for the exclusive benefit of the widow and next of kin. In inter-
preting this statute, the principal case, following Jeffersonville R. R. Co. v. 
Swayne's Adm'r., 26 Ind. 477, held that the damages must be measured by 
the loss to the widow and next of kin caused by the death of the intestate; 
that the statute therefore created an entirely new cause of action in the 
widow and next of kin, and this cause of action was no part of the intestate's 
estate. This interpretation was followed in Perry v. St. Joseph & Western 
Ry. Co., 29 Kan. 420. On the other hand, the courts of Nebraska, Iowa, and 
Minnesota emphasize that part of the statute which says that the suit must 
be brought by the personal representative of the deceased, and hold that 
this shows an intent that the right of action should be a part of the dece-
dent's estate, even though the entire amount is to be paid over to the widow 
or next of kin. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Bradley, 51 Neb. 596; Morris v. C., R. 
I. & P., 65 Iowa 727; Hutchins v. St. Paul, M. & M. Ry., 44 Minn. 5. The 
practical result of the holding in Indiana and Kansas is that these courts 
have no jurisdiction to appoint an administrator to enforce the claim if 
the non-resident decedent had nq other assets within the state. Kansas, 
however, has a provision in her code (Par. 422) which allows a foreign 
administrator to come into the state and prosecute the action and thus pre-
vent the right from being lost, Kans. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Cutter, 16 Kans. 568; 
although, where the injury occurred' in Kansas, suit under the Kansas law 
may be denied at the domicile. Oates v. U. P. Ry. Co., 104 Mo. 514. Can 
the question of jurisdiction to appoint an administrator because of lack of 
assets be raised by collateral attack? In McCarroii v. N. Y. Cent. (Mass., 
1921), 131 N. E. 478, the court assumed, without deciding, that the question 
of jurisdiction could be raised by such attack, but held that if the court 
had jurisdiction a collateral attack could not raise the objection that some-
one, other than the administrator appointed, should have been appointed. 
The modern tendency of the cases, however, is that the question of juris-
diction cannot be raised by collateral attack. See note, 18 L. R. A. 242. 
